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Abstract: In this paper a definition and conceptual analysis of trust is given in terms 
of trustworthiness. Its focus will be as wide as possible, and will not be restricted to 
any particular type of trust. The aim is to show the key parameters that enable us to 
investigate  and  understand  trust,  thereby  facilitating  the  development  of  systems, 
institutions and technologies to support, model or mimic trust. The paper will also 
show  the  strong  connection  between  trust  and  trustworthiness,  showing  how  the 
subjectivity of trust reveals itself in attitudes toward others’ trustworthiness; to trust 
someone/something  is  to  believe  that  he/she/it  is  trustworthy.  Both  trust  and 
trustworthiness  are  context-dependent,  but  the  relevant  contexts  are  different 
depending on whether one is trusting or trustworthy. Finally, the paper will discuss 
some  of  the  complex  issues  connected  with  the  alignment  of  trust  with 
trustworthiness. 
Introduction 
In this paper I shall attempt to produce a general definition, or conceptual analysis, of 
trust. The focus will be as wide as possible; I do not want to restrict my analysis to 
any particular type of trust. I wish the analysis to apply to trust that is arguably hard-
wired, and to trust that is entirely rationally-based, to any kind of appropriate agent 
(human,  animal  or  artificial),  and  in  the  context  not  only  of  individuals  but  also 
institutions  and  organisations.  The  paradigm  of  a  relationship  involving  trust  is 
usually thought to be that between two individuals who are able to size each other up 
in imperfect but indicative ways.  However, the evolution of the concept does not 
determine exactly how it can and should consistently and usefully be extended, and so 
although this paradigm is important, I will not take it as a typical case. Similarly, it is 
plausible that trust began as a moral concept, and it carries a great deal of ethical 
force; nevertheless, trust need not always be applied in morally-suffused situations, 
and I will not treat the moral dimension as definitive. 
The aim of the analysis is to reveal the key parameters that enable us to investigate 
and understand trust, to work out how and why there can be too much trust in a 
society, or too little, and to develop institutions and technologies that facilitate well-
placed trust, or mimic its effects in appropriate ways via design. Of course, such an 
analysis will not solve problems, but hopefully will at least enable problems to be 
stated accurately. 
The analysis is of trust, and of the related idea of trustworthiness. I do not intend to 
delimit or define related ideas such as risk, complexity, uncertainty and confidence 
(although I shall make some brief remarks about reliance and reliability). It may be O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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that the boundaries between these ideas are quite porous anyway, or that there is little 
consensus over exactly what the relationships are. In this paper, I also do not intend to 
critique other theories,  or to  contrast  this  theory  with  them;  I will merely  state  a 
definition, and so this working paper contains no references. 
Apart  from  this  introduction  and  a  conclusion,  the  paper  has  three  substantive 
sections. The first discusses the important and prior concept of trustworthiness. The 
second then defines trust, and discusses the various components of the definition. The 
third  discusses  what  is  often  formulated  as  the  problem  of  trust,  the  difficulty  of 
aligning  trust  and  trustworthiness  effectively  and  accurately.  A  short  conclusion 
discusses future work. 
Trustworthiness 
The  essential  prior  concept  for  understanding  trust  is  trustworthiness.  Trust  is  an 
attitude  that  one  takes  to  the  trustworthiness  of  another;  in  turn,  the  other’s 
trustworthiness is a property that they have. Broadly speaking, it is the property that 
they will do what they say they will do. If they fail, then it will typically be for some 
reason outside their control. 
Trustworthiness is  naturally not  context-independent; one is  not  trustworthy in  all 
respects in all contexts. One might be a trustworthy car mechanic without being a 
trustworthy brain surgeon. One may be morally impeccable but somewhat naïve, so 
that one is trustworthy in the custody of money, but not trustworthy in the custody of 
a cunning child. 
Trustworthiness can be expressed as a quadruple, as in formula (1). 
(1) Tw<Y,Z,R(A),C> 
where Y and Z are agents, R is a representation of behaviour aimed at an 
audience A, and C is a context. 
 
This  states  that  Y  is  trustworthy.  Throughout  this  paper,  I  shall  use  Y  and  Z  as 
variables  for  agents.  In  particular,  for  ease  of  exposition  and  to  help  defuse 
ambiguities, I shall usually refer to Y using feminine pronouns. By this, of course I do 
not intend to suggest that only women can be trustworthy. 
(1) should therefore be read as: Y is willing, able and motivated to behave in such a 
way as to conform to R, to the benefit of members of A, in context C. The role of Z 
will be explained below. For ease of exposition, I shall write of Y being trustworthy; 
unless noted otherwise, I will be assuming R and C as given. In other words, I shall 
assume that there is some context for Y’s trustworthiness. 
The importance of a claim being made about intentions, 
capacities and motivations 
As noted, trustworthiness  is  not  usually completely  general; one is  trustworthy in 
specific respects. It would be ridiculous to try to judge whether, say, President Obama 
was a trustworthy teacher of differential equations, as he has not represented himself 
as  either  able  or  willing  to  teach  higher  mathematics  of  any  kind.  A  person  is 
trustworthy when she does what she says she will do. Hence Y is trustworthy only in 
the context of a claim that she has the intention, capacity and motivation to constrain 
her behaviour in some way. R is the relevant representation of the behaviour that she 
has  the  intention,  capacity  and  motivation  to  perform,  the  content  of  the  relevant O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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claim. Y might be judged untrustworthy if she is unwilling to conform to R, unable to 
conform to R, or lacking incentive to conform to R once it has been asserted to the 
relevant audience. 
Z is the agent responsible for creating and disseminating the representation R of Y’s 
intentions,  capacities  and  motivations.  It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  Z  has  the 
authority to make such a claim about Y. 
Context 
The context C is some type of relevant restriction of the circumstances in which Y is 
claimed to be willing, able and motivated to conform to R. C might be a particular 
type  of  task  (fixing  cars,  not  brain  surgery),  or  might  be  a  set  of  circumstances 
delineated by a particular role. Y may be willing, able and motivated to conform to R 
during office hours, when she is employed in a particular role, but unwilling to work 
out of hours. If she is, say, a lawyer, then she may be a trustworthy provider of legal 
advice between the hours of 9.30 and 5.30, but makes no commitment to answer 
requests out of hours or at weekends. 
C may be extremely precise, or alternatively very sketchily drawn. It may even be that 
Y is unable to describe the context exactly; she may rely on her (and others’) abilities 
to recognise when the situation is out of context. We may have to track her behaviour, 
to see when she is willing, able and motivated to conform to R, in order to determine 
(some of) the limits to C. C may even be variable over time, although it cannot be 
totally arbitrary or subject to random change. If C was subject to arbitrary change, 
then Y could not be said to be trustworthy; formula (1) would trivially entail that Y is 
trustworthy when she is trustworthy and not otherwise. 
Typically, the more commercial or contractual the relationship between Y and others 
is, the more precisely delineated C will be. As Y’s relationships become less formal 
and based less on mutual gain, then C will generally become more open-ended. 
Agency 
Who might Y be? Y can be anyone who may perform a task, upon whom one might 
wish  to  rely.  Y,  if  trustworthy,  is  willing,  able  and  motivated  to  conform  to  R. 
Therefore  a  statement  about  trustworthiness  implies  further  statements  about  Y’s 
intentions, capacities and incentives. Y must therefore be the type of thing that could 
have intentions, capacities and incentives. 
What about non-human agents? Is it possible for Y to be non-human? In this paper, I 
shall take a neutral stance about this issue. Much depends on whether we interpret 
terms like ‘intention’, ‘capacity’ and ‘incentive’ for non-human agents. Non-human 
agents have capacities; that seems straightforward. The issue of whether a non-human 
agent can properly be understood as trustworthy or not will then turn on whether 
one’s philosophy of mind allows metaphorical talk about the intentions and incentives 
for  them.  Clearly,  say,  a  piece  of  software  has  no  intention  to  work  in  anyone’s 
interest, although it may be intended to work in the interests of those who have paid 
for it. Once it has been paid for, then it is permanently ‘on call’ for its user. The 
question of the application of the term ‘trustworthy’ depends on how seriously one 
regards these inverted commas. It may be that we should speak not of trustworthy 
software, or trustworthy companies, but of ‘trustworthy’ software and ‘trustworthy’ 
companies. We might talk in terms of reliability rather than trustworthiness, and a 
suggestion is made as to how we could understand that distinction below. But we O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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should not expect a hard and fast distinction between reliability and trustworthiness, 
as they share a number of conceptual features. 
A non-human agent might be an animal (as in a trustworthy guard dog or racehorse, 
whose  behaviour  is  reliable),  a  piece  of  technology  (as  in  a  trustworthy  piece  of 
software or a bridge over a river), or an organisation (as in a company that provides a 
particular type of service). As long as their behaviour can conform to a representation 
of a behavioural ideal, then that will provide a source of evidence that these non-
human agents could in principle be counted as trustworthy. I will write as if it is not a 
category  error  for  non-human  agents  as  these  to  be  called  trustworthy;  however, 
nothing in the argument will hang on this assumption, and if the reader believes that 
trustworthiness can only properly apply to humans, or only to adults (or only to some 
classes of non-human agent, such as animals), then that will be consistent with the 
definition.  The  definitions  of  trustworthiness  and  trust  are  independent  of  these 
questions in the philosophy of mind. 
And who is the mysterious Z? This needs to be someone with the credentials to issue 
a representation of behaviour to which Y will conform. In the most common case, 
Y = Z – Y will represent herself as willing, able and motivated to behave in certain 
ways. 
Yet this will not always be the case. Where Y occupies some role in a company, then 
Z is the company which, or the officer who, defines the role that Y occupies, and 
takes it upon itself to certify (via job interviews, performance monitoring and the 
potential for using sanctions) that Y is indeed willing, able and motivated to occupy 
that role in a trustworthy manner. If Y is a piece of software, then Z might be the 
designer or the company that sells the software, or whoever issues the specification 
for the software’s performance. If Y is a racehorse, then Z might be the trainer who 
has trained Y using his tried and trusted methods to run fast and not to throw its 
jockey; Z’s claim R will then take the form of an honest appraisal of the horse’s 
ability to the jockey, to the owner or to the racing press. 
It  is  of  course  essential  that  Z  has  the  authority  to  issue  the  representation.  If  a 
political commentator determines that President Obama is untrustworthy because he 
has failed to perform some action (invading Iran, say), then we have to ask whether 
that  commentator  has  the  credentials  to  claim  that  Obama  was  willing,  able  and 
motivated to perform that action. 
When Y ≠ Z, there is scope for confusion about who has authority to make claims 
about whom. For example, in industry the practice of outsourcing services can lead to 
problems.  A  company  might  claim  that  an  operative  Y  is  trustworthy  in  some 
customer service role, but because it has outsourced the services to a service supplier 
or call centre, that company may not as a matter of fact be able to determine what Y is 
willing, able or motivated to do. The secondary supplier might be the only body able 
to do that, which could lead to problems of reputational damage if the primary and the 
secondary company (and Y) differ about her intentions, capacities and motivations. 
Representation 
The claim R is a representation of how Y should behave in the ideal. R needs to be 
disseminated by a Z with authority to do so, and Y’s behaviour (in context C) must 
conform to R. If it does not so conform, then Y or Z must be able to show that some 
unforeseen event prevented Y’s behaviour conforming with R. As with C, R might be 
open-ended or quite precise. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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Its precision may be at any one of a number of levels. For instance, an MP or a 
congresswoman  may  represent  herself  very  precisely  with  respect  to  her  ends,  as 
working  for  the  benefit  of  her  constituents  in  various  respects  (improving  their 
economic position, reducing  crime in  their neighbourhood, or whatever), but  may 
leave open the exact means she will pursue. A doctor represents herself very precisely 
as working to restore her patients to health, but she may give herself a lot of leeway in 
how she achieves that. 
Alternatively,  R  may  specify  very  precisely  the  exact  steps  that  Y  will  take  in 
response  to  various  contexts.  Y  may  have  remarkably  little  discretion,  and  must 
perform her task in very specifically defined ways. This is less usual; in the most 
usual  type  of  case,  one  expects  a  trustworthy  person  to  behave  in  ways  that  are 
congruent to a particular set of interests, as with the MP or the doctor. Depending how 
much of R is left open to interpretation, there is more or less scope for dispute. Y is 
trustworthy when she is willing, able and motivated to behave in certain ways; that 
does not determine that she will succeed in all respects. 
In many cases, R will represent Y’s duties, or her responsibilities. In these cases, then 
moral judgments may be made about Y’s trustworthiness. 
In (1), R has a place for a variable A, which denotes an intended audience. Y’s claim 
R will be aimed at a group of people or agents. A may contain everybody, when Y 
hopes to be trustworthy without restriction, but this is not generally the case. One 
might be trustworthy to one’s family, to one’s tribe or kin, to fellow nationals, to 
one’s clients or paying customers. A racist may be willing only to be trustworthy to 
those with whom she shares skin colour. 
This audience could be conceived as an aspect of the task context, but it is important 
enough to separate it out as an extra variable. Y simply does not want a relationship 
with,  or  to  be  beholden  to,  everyone  without  limit.  Her  promises  will  at  least 
sometimes  be  precisely  targeted  to  certain  individuals  or  groups.  A  mother  will 
behave as a mother only to her children. She may be in loco parentis to other people’s 
children for brief and defined periods, but her trustworthiness as a mother extends 
unconditionally only to her children. Put another way, Y’s trustworthiness is intended 
only to benefit members of A (Y will typically be neutral about whether non-members 
of A benefit from her trustworthiness, whether directly or indirectly). A soldier may 
fight to defend the homeland, although citizens of allied nations may also benefit from 
his  endeavour; the soldier will not  mind that,  although he would not  be properly 
motivated if those allies were all that he was fighting for. 
The notion of audience gives us a way in to understanding the content of R. The 
members of A are those whom Y intended to benefit from her trustworthiness.  R 
should therefore  convey in  what  way Y is  willing,  able and motivated to  behave 
(including subordinating her own interests narrowly conceived), in order to serve the 
interests of members of A. 
R may be explicit or implicit; more usually it will have explicit and implicit aspects. It 
may  be  that  the  expectations  of  Y’s  behaviour  are  almost  totally  unwritten  and 
implicit; being a ‘good neighbour’, for instance, implies a lot of things and raises a lot 
of expectations, but is extremely open-ended. On the other hand, when a professional 
represents  herself  as  providing  a  particular  service,  she  may  be  relatively  explicit 
about ends and even means. As R becomes more explicit, it begins to resemble a 
contract; an R that is more implicit is correspondingly less contractual. Even a very O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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explicit R may also contain implicit limits. If Y were a car mechanic, she might well 
represent herself explicitly as willing, able and motivated to fix cars of a certain make 
with a certain range of maladies within a certain period of time for a certain fee, but 
will not feel it necessary to add what is also true, that after the repair she will return 
the car to the owner. 
R may also be inclusive or exclusive. We may understand R as determining a set of 
things, however precisely specified, that Y must do. An MP must act in the interests 
of her constituents as set out in her manifesto. Or alternatively, R may simply rule out 
things, however, precisely specified, that Y must not do. The MP must not enrich 
herself or her family, or her political party, via the public purse. In most cases, R will 
have inclusive and exclusive aspects, which in turn may be explicit or implicit. A car 
mechanic must (attempt to) fix the car; she must not keep it for herself. 
R will generally degrade gracefully. As we approach, and cross, the borders of context 
C, it is unusual for someone to decide suddenly not to conform to R. Quite often, 
people  will  do  their  best  in  somewhat  unfamiliar  circumstances.  A  doctor  who 
specialises in one kind of medicine will do her best when presented with a different 
kind of illness when the right kind of specialist in unavailable (e.g. on an aeroplane). 
She should not be held to the same kind of standards as the specialist, of course, but 
will generally try to conform to a less stringent version of R as best she can. 
This is not always the case; in the UK, the pejorative term ‘jobsworth’ applies to a 
person who  refuses  to  conform  to  R the moment  that the border of  C is  crossed 
(someone who will not work even five minutes after the office closes, or who will 
never interpret a rule in a sympathetic way – a person who refuses to help because 
“it’s more than my job’s worth”). And a piece of trustworthy software  should be 
expected to crash (even if it does not) if the conditions of its designed function do not 
obtain. 
Z (or Y) need not be responsible for the content of R. Z simply needs to be able to 
assert with authority that Y’s behaviour will conform to R in C. R may be determined 
by social processes; for instance, a trustworthy neighbour, or trustworthy mother, does 
not define what constitutes ideal neighbourliness or motherhood herself. These are 
determined  by  norms  in  a  community,  and  Y  simply  needs  to  signal  that  she  is 
prepared to conform to them. In many cases, R is understood across a community, and 
Z is able to assert that Y will conform to such a pre-existing R. In still other cases, as 
we shall come to note below, R is negotiated between Z and a trustor to meet the 
trustor’s specific requirements. 
On other occasions, Z (or Y) does generate the content of R. A company that employs 
Y in a particular role will often define that role. Perhaps the most usual case is that Z 
defines the detail of the content of R within a socially-generated template; we all 
know broadly speaking what a car mechanic is willing, able and motivated to do, but 
the garage that employs her will define the detail, such as what times of day this 
applies, or what types of car she is qualified to work on. In that case, most of R is a 
social construct, which Z (the garage) has adjusted slightly to conform to its terms of 
employment of Y. 
Finally, of course one’s intentions, capacities and motivations can be represented in 
different ways, and so one can be trustworthy and untrustworthy at the same time, 
depending on which representation one has disseminated to which audience. If Y is a 
spy,  she  could  represent  her  intentions,  capacities  and  motivations  to  her  home O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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country as R, and represent her intentions, capacities and motivations to her foreign 
employers as R’. If her behaviour conformed to R’ instead of R – e.g., instead of 
guarding the secret plans with her life, she photographs them and gives them to a 
foreign agent – then she would be deemed untrustworthy by the authorities in her 
home country, but trustworthy by the authorities in her foreign employer. There is no 
contradiction in this. 
Trustworthiness versus reliability 
It may be that the root of the distinction between trustworthiness and reliability (and 
by extension the distinction between trust and reliance) can be traced to the role of R. 
Where R is very inflexible, specific, explicit and precise, it may be that reliability is 
the more appropriate quality of Y, rather than trustworthiness. Where R is flexible, 
unspecific, implicit and/or imprecise, this may be a situation where Y is a candidate 
for trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is likelier to degrade gracefully than reliability. 
However that may be, elaborating the distinction is not the purpose of this paper, so I 
shall not explore this thought in much detail, except to point out that the distinction is 
not a sharp one, and so one should expect the two concepts to blur into each other. It 
may be that trustworthiness is a species of reliability, in which case everyone/thing 
that is trustworthy is ipso facto reliable, but even so there will be tricky borderline 
cases.  We  often  talk  perfectly  intelligibly  of  trusting,  as  well  as  relying  on, 
calculators, bridges or plastic corks in wine bottles; this is to be expected, as trust and 
reliance, and trustworthiness and reliability, share a good many logical properties. 
Generalised trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness, as in (1), is usually relative to a task or a context. However, we are 
prone to describe certain people as trustworthy as a general character trait. Given (1), 
the interpretation of general trustworthiness is fairly straightforward to specify. 
(2) If Tw<Y,Z,R(A),C> whenever a Z with authority properly represents Y as 
being willing, able and motivated to conform to R to the benefit of 
members of audience A, then Y can be seen as generally trustworthy. 
 
In other words, if Y is trustworthy in all (or most) specific contexts where she has a 
duty, or is claimed, to be trustworthy, then she is generally trustworthy. 
So, for example, if we revisit the case where Y is a spy, we see that, though she is 
trustworthy from the point of view of her foreign employers, we could not seriously 
entertain the wider proposition that she was a trustworthy person generally. 
Trust 
In this section, I shall define trust on the basis of the prior concept of trustworthiness. 
Having given a definition, I shall discuss some of the issues raised by the definition in 
more detail. 
Broadly speaking, trust is an attitude toward the trustworthiness of an individual. In 
short, if X trusts Y, then X has a positive view of Y’s trustworthiness. If we take an 
agent’s attitude toward another agent to be a belief about that agent, we get: 
(3) X trusts Y =df X believes that Y is trustworthy 
where X and Y are agents. 
 O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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If ‘belief’ is not considered equivalent to ‘attitude held by agents’ then this pleasingly 
simple formulation of trust will have to be replaced by the more complex sentence of 
English ‘X’s attitude toward Y is that she is trustworthy’. 
I will use X throughout this paper as a variable for a trustor, and Y throughout as a 
variable denoting a trustee. I shall disambiguate by using masculine pronouns to refer 
to X and feminine pronouns to refer to Y. Once more, the reader should avoid the 
elementary  error  of  confusing  grammar  and  sexuality,  and  should  make  no 
assumptions about real-world gender on the basis of these grammatical conventions. 
As we have seen, ‘Y is trustworthy’ is a complex proposition anchored to a context, 
and so X’s attitude toward it also has a complex representation anchored to a different 
context of relevance to X. Because of the difference between the contexts in which X 
makes his judgment, and in which Y envisages her claim for trustworthiness, it is not 
quite  as  straightforward  as  X  holding  that  Tw<Y,Z,R(A),C>.  Trust  should  be 
represented  as  a  6-place  relation,  in  which  a  proposition  about  X’s  attitude  is 
embedded, as follows. 
(4) Tr<X,Y,Z,I(R[A],c),Deg,Warr> 
where X, Y and Z are agents as before, and I(R[A],c), Deg and Warr are 
qualifiers of X’s attitude to Y’s trustworthiness to be described in more 
detail below. 
 
If we are allowed to take ‘belief’ as a shorthand for X’s attitude toward Y, this 6-place 
relation can be read as ‘X believes that Y is trustworthy, on some account proposed 
by  Z,  which  X  takes  as  entailing  I(R[A],c).  He  has  a  confidence  Deg  in  his 
belief/attitude in Y’s trustworthiness, and the belief/attitude is based on a warrant 
Warr.’  In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  I  will  expand  on  the  functions  of  these 
variables. 
Trust as an attitude 
Trust is an attitude, which brings it into the scope of the philosophy of mind. I do not 
have to solve, or even to have a view on, these issues. For instance, it makes no odds 
to  the  definition  of  trust  whether  one  is  a  representationalist,  a  dispositionalist,  a 
functionalist or an eliminativist about attitudes, as long as one believes that we have 
attitudes,  and  that  embedded  in  formula  (4)  is  the  sort  of  thing  we  may  have  an 
attitude  about.  Although  I  am  sceptical  about  the  common  philosophical  view  of 
belief as necessarily concerning propositional attitudes, (4) is surely consistent with 
that common view. 
In the rest of this paper, I shall talk of people ‘making trust judgments’. By this I 
mean they will be coming to trust or not trust someone or something else. I don’t 
mean to imply they have a strong level of control over their cognitive processes. 
Hence those who are of the opinion that people have very little control over cognitive 
process should take this sort of phrase as loose, metaphorical talk only. It does not 
affect the definition or the argument. 
Finally, we must not lose sight of one important effect of trust being an attitude of an 
agent, which is that X’s perceptions are paramount. The facts of the matter (which are 
important for trustworthiness) count for less than X’s perceptions of the situation. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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Agency 
X, Y and Z are as noted in (4): X is the trustor, Y the trustee, and Z is the person 
making  the  relevant  authoritative  claim  about  Y’s  intentions,  capacities  and 
motivations. This is all seen through X’s eyes, as we are describing an attitude X has 
toward Y. In particular, it should be the case that Z is authorised to make claim R 
about Y; however, what is important for trust is that X believes that Z is so authorised. 
Conversely, even if Z is authorised, if X does not believe that he is, he is unlikely to 
trust Y on that basis. Again the reader should consider the usual caveats about the use 
of the term ‘belief’ as a shorthand for an attitude toward Z; it is simply easier to 
construct an English sentence around the verb ‘believe’. 
Instantiations of the X, Y and Z variables 
How do X, Y and Z relate to each other? X is to have an attitude toward Y, Y will be 
trustworthy if and only if she is willing, able and motivated to conform to R, and Z is 
the authorised person who makes the claim that Y is willing, able and motivated to 
conform to R. X, Y and Z could all be different people. 
The most obvious potential equivalence, as noted above, is that Z could be identical to 
Y. Y can make her own claims about her intentions, abilities and motivations, and 
more often than not this is the case. But other equivalences are possible too. 
Can X be identical to Y? Yes, one can trust oneself – or, perhaps more strikingly, one 
can fail to trust oneself. A recovering alcoholic, for instance, might take his dog for a 
walk on a route that does not involve his passing a pub, because he does not trust 
himself to resist the temptation. Normally, one trusts oneself routinely, implicitly and 
‘invisibly’, but in the case of the alcoholic, the day when he trusts himself to go past 
the pub without entering may be a big day in his life. 
If X is identical to Y, then in most of those cases, they will also be identical to Z – in 
other words, the trustor, trustee and the guarantor of the trustee’s behaviour are all the 
same person. But it is also possible that trustor X and trustee Y be identical, while the 
guarantor  Z  is  someone  else.  In  the  alcoholic  example,  the  representation  of  the 
alcoholic’s good behaviour could be provided by a therapist (“you are cured, you will 
be  able  to  pass  the  pub  without  entering”).  Hence  X  trusts  himself,  possibly 
reluctantly, to behave as Z, the therapist, has assured him he will. To be sure, X, the 
alcoholic, also trusts the therapist Z – a recursive aspect of trust that I shall discuss in 
more detail below. But the main thing from this point of view is that X trusts X to 
conform to a representation of his intentions, abilities and motivations provided by a 
different person Z. 
Could X be identical to Z without being identical to Y? In such situation, the trustor 
would be the person making the claim about the trustee’s behaviour. One apparent 
possibility  would  be  that  X  is  a  manager  who  employs  Y  and  dictates  the 
representation of trustworthy behaviour that Y is expected to conform to in her job. X 
trusts Y to do the job, which X has also defined. However, this is not a case where the 
trustor  is  identical  to  the  trustee’s  guarantor;  this  would  confuse  two  separate 
instances of trust. X trusts Y’s representation of herself as someone willing and able 
to  do  the  job;  here  Y  is  being  her  own  Z,  i.e.  representing  her  own  intentions, 
capacities and motivations to X. However, a customer of X’s company, call him X1, 
approaches Y as a member of the company, whose prospectus advertises that all its 
employees are willing, able and motivated to conform to R (defined by X). Hence in 
this second case, X is the person making claims about the trustee Y, but is not the O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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trustor. At no stage does X believe his own claims about Y’s intentions, capacities and 
motivations. In the first case, X believes Y’s claims about her own intentions, and in 
the second he himself makes a claim about Y’s intentions that is believed by the 
customer X1. 
A better type of example is where X trusts Y without encouragement from Y, and 
supplies the representation R of Y’s intentions, abilities and motivations himself. For 
example, X may love Y, and persuade himself, without any help from Y, that she is 
willing, able and motivated to stay faithful and true to him. It is, perhaps, unlike that 
such trust will be well-placed, as X is not authorised to speak for Y. However, he may 
also  persuade  himself  that  he  knows  Y  better  than  she  knows  herself,  and  that 
therefore  he  can  represent  her  intentions,  capacities  and  motivations  accurately. 
Inappropriate trust of a person who is both unfaithful and not hypocritical about it is a 
common staple of fiction, as for example with Amelia’s love of George Osborne in 
Vanity Fair, or Rose’s love of Pinkie in Brighton Rock. At worst, such misplaced trust 
leads to the extreme and unmotivated feelings of betrayal that often lie behind the 
crime of ‘stalking’. 
Another example of this type of trust relationship is where trust is ‘forced’ upon an 
untrustworthy person in order to socialise them. For example, it is a common strategy 
to give young people responsibilities in order to build their character, as with the 
Outward Bound educational organisation, which puts its charges into situations which 
creates in the individual a state of dissonance requiring adaptive coping, which leads 
to a sense of mastery when equilibrium is managed (as they note in their literature). 
The point here is that the claim (R) about the abilities of the learner is made by the 
educator (X), not the learner (Y) herself. Hence the educator not only takes the X role 
in the trust relation, but also the Z role. 
In these cases where X = Z, X believes that he knows Y’s intentions, capacities and 
motivations better than Y does herself. The truth of X’s belief is not relevant for 
establishing the fact of X’s trust. 
The role of roles 
Trust and trustworthiness can be focused on individuals or on roles; I have already 
written briefly about the roles that can be played by a trustworthy person. When X 
trusts Y, for example to be his bank manager, then it may be that he trusts her because 
of her personal qualities, with which he is acquainted, or it may be that he trusts her 
because she occupies a role whose occupant he trusts. If Y moves on, to be replaced 
by Y1, in the latter case, X will now trust Y1, the new occupant of the role. In the 
former case, we can deduce nothing about X’s attitudes in the new circumstances. We 
can say nothing about his attitudes towards Y1 as we have no evidence, and we can 
say nothing about his attitudes towards Y, because we do not know what new claims 
about Y’s intentions, capacities and motivations are being made since she moved on 
from her job (X may now believe that Y has been promoted above her capacities, for 
example). 
A trustor can also find that he has to tailor his judgments to a role he is playing. A 
judge or a jury member should, if possible, suppress many of the trust judgments they 
make as an individual when they are in the courtroom. It may be that Y’s eyes being 
too close together make her appear untrustworthy, but that is not relevant evidence in 
assessing  whether  a  crime  has  been  committed  by  her.  In  any  role  with  public 
responsibility, someone who was disposed not to trust people of a certain ethnic group O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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would  be  very  wrong  to  allow  that  disposition  to  interfere  with  his  professional 
judgments. A football referee is well aware qua human being that a trivial contact 
between two players, trained athletes both, is extremely unlike to send one of them 
crashing to the ground in extreme agony, but qua football referee he is bound to treat 
the incident  as  one where physical  contact  has  constituted foul play  and where a 
stretcher is required to ferry the wounded hero from the ground in case there has been 
serious injury. 
In  each  case,  as  we  unpack  the  complex  proposition  that 
Tr<X,Y,Z,I(R[A],c),Deg,Warr>, the way that  X, Y and Z are identified may  well 
change the meaning of the expression. ‘X trusts Y’ (in some context) may have a 
different truth value depending on how the variables are filled in: ‘John Brown trusts 
Mary Green’ is different from ‘John Brown trusts the Governor of Clink Prison’, 
which is different again from ‘Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons trusts the Governor 
of Clink Prison’. The last, unlike the first,  conveys nothing whatsoever about the 
personal relationship between John Brown and Mary Green. 
Types of agent 
X must be an agent capable of holding a complex attitude toward Y’s intentions, 
capacities and motivations. Once more, questions of what type of agent that might be 
devolves to the philosophy of mind. Once more, I have no great problem with babies, 
non-human animals, artificial agents or organisations holding such attitudes, but the 
line might be drawn more tightly on philosophical grounds without doing harm to the 
definition. 
I shall on occasion use terms such as ‘belief’ – this I hope will not entail that trust can 
only be held by humans. It may be the case that trust can only be held by humans, but 
that should be a separate argument from the logical structure of trust which I set out 
here. Hence my definition should be, and is, consistent with the view that non-humans 
and undeveloped humans can trust, and also be consistent with the view that trust is 
restricted to the human realm. If my occasional use of the term ‘belief’ is regarded as 
prejudicing  this  question,  I  hope  the  reader  will  give  me  a  certain  expositional 
latitude, and make the requisite substitution in his or her head. 
It might also be the case that certain agents, even if capable of trust, are capable only 
of a circumscribed type of trust judgment. A baby, for example, might be deemed 
capable of trusting its mother in several open-ended and implicit respects, but quite 
out of its depth when it came to assessing which of several candidate solicitors would 
be most trustworthy for the purchase of a new house. A piece of software designed by 
a bank to assess whether someone applying for a loan is trustworthy in respect of 
paying back the loan on time would be hopeless for determining whether someone is a 
trustworthy car mechanic. Indeed, the software would be hopeless at determining the 
trustworthiness of the would-be borrower if the evidence it received diverged from the 
expected input for its program (e.g. it would be unable to make even a guess at the 
candidate  borrower’s  trustworthiness  based  on  signs  such  as  the  firmness  of  her 
handshake or her ability to look it openly in the eye, or evidence of her wealth such as 
her clothes, car and house). So a capacity to trust in some contexts would not imply a 
capacity to trust elsewhere. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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The subjective elements 
Trust,  like  trustworthiness,  is  context-dependent.  As  an  attitude  toward  the 
trustworthiness of another it inherits the context-dependence of trustworthiness itself, 
but  it  brings  in  further  subjective  elements  of  its  own.  These  are  the  final  three 
elements of formula (4), which will be described in detail in this subsection. 
The interpretation of commitments 
If Y is trustworthy, then a claim R(A) must have been made about her intentions, 
capacities and motivations with respect to an audience A in some context C. When X 
trusts Y, then he must interpret that claim. R, to recall, is often, perhaps usually, 
implicit; even if explicit, there will be complex or borderline cases, and it may involve 
statements  about  Y’s  interests  or  intentions,  rather  than  exact  specifications  of 
behaviour. So it is not a trivial matter for a potential trustor to work out how Y’s 
intention to conform to R in C will result in particular behaviour that is desirable for 
X in the contexts that X is interested in. 
Hence X’s trust in Y will include only an oblique reference to R in its description. The 
fourth term in (4) is written I(R[A],c), in which c is the particular context or set of 
contexts  in  which  X  has  his  own  specific  interests.  To  be  properly  applicable,  it 
should be that c ⊆ C, otherwise of course the claim about Y’s intentions, capacities 
and motivations does not apply. Furthermore, it must also be the case that X  A, 
otherwise it will not be Y’s intention that X gain from her trustworthiness; if X  A, 
Y promises X nothing. 
Assuming  c ⊆ C,  then  X  will  interpret  R  in  c.  In  other  words,  he  will  form 
expectations of how R will circumscribe or dictate Y’s behaviour to his own benefit 
(assuming X  A) in c, which I have written as I(R[A],c), taking I as a function on 
R(A) ⨯ C. 
X must believe that X  A and c ⊆ C, and that R(A) entails I(R[A],c) in the restricted 
class of contexts c. That does not mean that these propositions are actually true, or 
that Y or Z believes they are. 
It follows from that that it is not necessarily the case that I(R[A],c) correctly describes 
what  Y  will  do,  but  that  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  Y  has  let  X  down.  For 
instance, a theme in Sherlock Holmes stories is that Holmes behaves in ways which 
surprise  and  dismay  his  clients.  They  are  cross  that  he  is  thinking  about  ‘trivial’ 
matters, and are ignoring what seem to be the important factors. Of course, Holmes is 
proved right in the end; he was trustworthy all along (he was working in his clients’ 
interests,  as  he  claimed  he  was),  but  the  clients’  interpretation  of  that  claim  was 
inaccurate. In general, the more explicit that R is, presumably the more likely it is that 
I(R[A],c) is accurate, although there will always be room for a mismatch. On the other 
hand, if R is implicit but relies on commonly shared social norms (such as well-
understood notions of financial probity), then I(R[A],c) may be spot on. 
Hence I(R[A],c) introduces three important subjective elements of trust – first of all, 
the  interpretation  of  the  claim  about  Y’s  intentions,  capacities  and  motivations; 
secondly,  the  restriction  of  the  application  of  Y’s  trustworthiness  to  the  range  of 
contexts  which  interest  X;  and  thirdly,  the  belief  that  X  is  part  of  Y’s  intended 
audience. 
Note finally that the situation need not be such that X is presented with a fait accompli 
by Z. The content of R, the membership of A, or the meaning of I(R[A],c), can be O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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(and  often  is)  negotiated  between  X  and  Z  –  X  sets  out  his  requirements  for 
interaction with Y, and Z crafts a set of incentives or directions for Y that meet X’s 
requirements.  That  may  reduce  the  possibility  of  mismatch  between  trustor  and 
trustee, but of course there is always scope for misinterpretation and failure to agree 
on the basic semantics (as well as deliberate subversion by Y). 
To  summarise  the  import  of  the  first  four  variables  of  (4),  we  should  read  it  as 
expressing that X believes that Y’s intentions, capacities and motivations conform to 
I(R[A],c), which X also believes is entailed by R(A), a claim about how Y will pursue 
the interests of members of A, made about Y by a suitably authorised Z. 
Degree of confidence 
The fifth variable in (4) is Deg, which is the degree to which X believes that Y is 
trustworthy, or the confidence that X has in his attitude. The intuition here is that one 
has stronger attitudes about some things than others, and that some attitudes are more 
firmly or confidently held than others. This is an important parameter in the analysis 
of trust for two reasons. 
First of all, we are able to make comparative judgments about trust. It is important in 
many respects to know that X trusts Y1 more than Y2. For example, it may explain 
why he bought an item from Y1 rather than an identical but slightly cheaper item from 
Y2. In that particular case, it would allow a rational explanation of X’s purchasing 
decision. All things being equal if X’s degree of confidence in Y1’s trustworthiness is 
higher than his degree of confidence in Y2’s trustworthiness, X is more likely to rely 
on Y1 than Y2. 
Secondly, trust is an important risk management tool, and Deg helps explain risk 
management strategies. Broadly speaking, if X trusts Y, he will be willing to risk 
some of his  assets  in  transactions  which could  be affected by Y. The  greater his 
confidence in Y’s trustworthiness, all things being equal, the greater the value of the 
assets he will be prepared to risk (the greater the risks he will be prepared to take). 
Degree of confidence is therefore an important parameter. How do we measure it? 
The definition I am proposing is neutral about this, so once again one could apply to a 
number of disciplines depending on one’s purposes. One could analyse real-world 
data (for  example, from  an online auction site) about  genuine decisions  to  find a 
metric. One could perform experiments in the lab, perhaps within a game-theoretic 
framework. One could simply sketch a model, maybe modelling degree of confidence 
in a fine-grained way as a real number between 0 and 1, or on a qualitative scale that 
could be quite coarse. One could aim for psychological realism in the trust judgments 
that resulted, or for justifiable rationality (for example, in some kind of automated 
trust advisory system). My own view is that nothing very complex is required as a 
description  of  judgments  in  daily  life  (maybe  a  5-point  qualitative  scale  enabling 
broad  comparisons  and  coarse-grained  risk  judgments),  but  nothing  in  the  theory 
outlined in this paper hangs on that intuition. 
We can now summarise the import of the first five variables of (4). We should read it 
as expressing that X believes, with confidence Deg, that Y’s intentions, capacities and 
motivations  conform  to  I(R[A],c),  which  X  also  believes  is  entailed  by  R(A),  an 
authorised claim about how Y will pursue the interests of members of A, made about 
Y by a suitably authorised Z. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
 
14 
 
Warrant 
The final variable in (4) is Warr, which stands for the warrant for X’s belief, attitude 
or judgment about Y’s trustworthiness, and also the warrant for the particular value of 
Deg that is associated with it. In other words, it describes the positive and negative 
input to X’s judgment. 
Once more, (4) is neutral over what type of thing Warr might be. As long as Warr 
explains the judgment, then it is adequate. It is worth emphasising that Warr need not 
be a set of propositions, and the trust judgment should not assumed to be rational 
(although of course sometimes it will be). It should also be insisted that the warrant is 
intended to explain the trust judgment, not to persuade others of its validity. 
This is an area for research in logic, sociology, psychology and neuroscience, and no 
doubt many more disciplines. Examples for factors that Warr might cover include: 
  Propositions from which X has derived a trust judgment, whether rationally or 
irrationally (for instance, after research into various service providers). 
  A statement or model of Y’s reputation. 
  X’s memory about past dealings with Y. 
  X’s views of the role Y plays. 
  Further trust judgments (perhaps X trusts Y’s employer). 
  Recommendations of Y by others. 
  Y’s qualifications or credentials. 
  A  credible  and  costly  commitment  made  by  Y  (for  instance,  if  X  is  not 
satisfied, Y will give him his money back). 
  Sanctions X can apply if Y defaults. 
  A response to subconscious signalling (for instance, people with features such 
as a symmetrical face tend to be trusted more, while people with other features 
such as facial hair tend to be trusted less. 
  A response to conscious signalling (for instance, Y is wearing a suit, or smiles 
a lot). 
  A  hard-wired  neuropsychological  process  (for  instance,  a  baby  trusting  its 
mother). 
  Responses to various chemicals (for instance, doses of oxytocin can increase 
trust). 
  Peer pressure. 
  Sexual attraction, or general ‘liking the look of’. 
  Feelings of racial or gender solidarity. 
Trust can be manipulated, and can be deeply irrational. It can also be highly rationally 
placed, and human society has developed a number of institutions, both formal and 
informal, which facilitate accurate trust judgments. Hence any general definition of 
trust such as (4) should be neutral between the sensible and the idiotic judgments. 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  there  should  be  some  warrant, 
however misguided, for X’s trust in Y. Note also that even some of the more rational O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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judgments  X  makes  can  be  subverted  if  Y  is  devious  enough;  for  example, 
qualifications  can  be  faked,  recommender  systems  spammed,  and  reputations 
manipulated. 
The warrant for a judgment is an important part of predicting what the repercussions 
of  the  judgment  will  be.  For  instance,  how  X  will  act  if  Y  turns  out  to  be 
untrustworthy depends at least partly on the ground for his original judgment. 
We can now summarise the import of (4). We should read it as: 
(5) X believes, with confidence Deg on the basis of warrant Warr, that Y’s 
intentions, capacities and motivations conform to I(R[A],c), which X 
also believes is entailed by R(A), a claim about how Y will pursue the 
interests of members of A, made about Y by a suitably authorised Z. 
Trust as an action: placing trust 
Trust  is  an  attitude  or  belief,  and  so  –  unless  one  is  a  behaviourist  of  quite  a 
reductionist degree – need not be manifested constantly in behaviour. In particular, 
the  oft-made  connection  between  trust  and  risk,  while  real,  is  not  a  necessary  or 
internal connection. 
We should distinguish between X trusting Y, and X placing trust in Y. In the former 
case, (4) is true for X and Y. Given the truth of (4), X can start to place trust in Y by 
acting in various ways that would appear irrational otherwise. 
(6) X places trust in Y =df X performs some action which introduces a 
vulnerability for X, and which is inexplicable without the truth of (4) 
 
If (4) is true, then X trusts Y and he does not therefore believe that his action in 
placing trust in Y has introduced much of a vulnerability, because he believes that Y’s 
behaviour will conform to I(R[A],c) as explained above. Note that trusting someone is 
conceptually prior to placing trust in them, but that one can trust without placing trust. 
There are other ways in which trust can be evidenced without X placing any trust or 
exposing himself to any vulnerabilities. Most obviously, one can perform a simple 
speech act: X can announce “I trust Y”. This puts him at no risk and introduces no 
vulnerability. A similar type of behaviour is to make a recommendation, for example 
on eBay or by pressing a ‘like’ button about an Amazon review. 
Recursive trust; grounding trust 
As hinted earlier, trust  is  not  grounded;  it may be based on further trust.  So, for 
example, if X trusts Y to conform to some claim about her behaviour made by Z, part 
of the warrant for that might be that X trusts Z when the latter makes a supposedly 
authoritative claim about Y’s behaviour. As an example, Y may be a bank manager 
whom X trusts because he trusts the bank. His trust in Y does not ground out in other 
attitudes or beliefs – in this case it depends on further trust in Y’s institution. 
Put  in  the  terms  of  proposition  (4)  above,  the  Warr  variable  may  contain  further 
instances of trust to support the top level claim. 
To take an example, the warrant for X’s trust in Y may be based on Y’s reputation for 
plain and fair dealing. If X has not dealt with Y before, then his knowledge of her 
reputation will rest on some external source such as the confidence rating on eBay, for O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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instance. In that case, the strength of the warrant for X’s trust in Y will be (partly) 
dependent on the strength of his trust in the eBay rating system. 
Whether trust can be grounded totally – i.e. whether a trust claim could be made 
which does not feature another trust claim as part of its warrant – is a moot point. 
However, we should be aware that trust in something will often be based on trust in 
something else. Trust in an online bank may be based (in part) on trust in the https 
protocol, which in turn may be based on trust of the browser and operating system of 
one’s computer, which may in turn be based on trust of one’s brother-in-law who has 
an IT qualification and who installed the system, which in turn may be based on trust 
of one’s sister (which may or may not be hard-wired). However that may be, we 
cannot expect such trails of dependent trust judgments to always bottom out, even if 
our patience in tracing them might. 
The problem of trust 
Trust has many benefits for society – it makes interaction easier – and so it is often 
argued that levels of trust should be raised. This is not the case – if we trust people 
who are not trustworthy, then interactions will become more risky and costlier. We 
cannot think about trust without considering trustworthiness at the same time. The 
purpose of this section is to sketch the fundamental political and social requirements 
that trust and trustworthiness pose. 
Costs and benefits: a prisoner-style dilemma 
There are many tragedies in the human condition, but one of them is the following. 
The trustor X benefits from the trustworthiness of the trustee Y; unfortunately he 
controls  only  his  own  trust.  The  trustee  Y  benefits  from  being  trusted  by  X; 
unfortunately she controls only her own trustworthiness. The result is a prisoner-style 
dilemma when two agents come to cooperate in such a way as to require trust. The 
situation looks like this: 
X\Y  Trustworthy  Not trustworthy 
Trusts  Maximum benefits of 
cooperation 
X loses, and Y gains, whatever he risks 
Does not 
trust 
Y loses whatever she invests 
in her trustworthiness 
No interaction, so neither benefit nor 
harm. Opportunity costs for both agents. 
Let us plug in some numbers. Let us assume that X and Y may collaborate on a task 
such that, if it succeeds, they each gain $10. To succeed, X must risk some assets, let 
us say $3, and must trust Y to deal with them fairly. In turn, to be trustworthy is not 
cost-free for Y; she must make certain security arrangements which will cost her $1 as 
a sunk cost. An example would be a bet on a horse. Y can get information about a 
sure-fire cert which will cost her in hospitality for her informant, but has no extra 
money  for  a  bet.  X  has  money  for  a  bet  but  no  inside  information.  The  obvious 
arrangement is that Y obtains the information, at some cost to her, from her informant, 
and X gives her the money for the bet. They agree to split the winnings equally. X, if 
he does not trust Y, can simply not fund the bet. Y, if she is not trustworthy, will not 
bother obtaining the information from her informant, but instead will pocket X’s stake 
money if she can. The matrix now looks like this: 
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X\Y  Trustworthy  Not trustworthy 
Trusts  10\9  -3\3 
Does not trust  0\-1  0\0 
Looking at the matrix, X might reason that if he trusts, he may gain $10, but equally 
could  end  up  $3  down.  If  he  does  not  trust,  he  will  at  least  be  square  whatever 
happens. Not trusting may well look like the safe option. Similarly, Y might reason 
that if she is trustworthy, she may be $9 in front, but equally she could have spent a 
dollar for no return. On the other hand, if she is not trustworthy, she can’t end up 
worse off than she is, and may pocket $3. 
Hence trust and trustworthiness pose a coordination problem that will be hard to solve 
using only rational self-interest as a means. 
Stating the problem 
The problem is simple to state, and of course it is not that we merely should wish to 
raise levels of trust, or to create a high-trust society. The main issue is to try to ensure 
that we trust all and only trustworthy agents, or at least to approach that state as an 
asymptote. There should be a causal connection between the trustworthiness of one 
agent and the formation of an attitude of trust towards her by another. 
Similarly, rather than trying to spread trust, we should aim for a high-trustworthiness 
society, in which trust is placed effectively, thereby reducing both the possibility of 
fraud and the opportunity cost of failing to trust appropriately, while still maximising 
the opportunities for cooperation and interaction. 
The twofold nature of the problem, the need to connect an attitude with a property, 
creates  the  well-known  moral  hazard  of  trust.  A  would-be  trustee  should  be 
trustworthy,  and  take  steps  to  ensure  that  her  actions  always  fall  within  the 
authoritative  claims  being  made  about  her.  This  can  be  quite  an  investment  in 
resources, and even that will not necessarily lead to her being trusted. To get trust, she 
will also need to market herself in appealing ways, to get the message through to 
potential trustors. The danger is always that she may reason that if trustworthiness is 
not enough to get trust, and if marketing will make the difference, why should she 
bother with trustworthiness at all? Maybe marketing will be enough. 
Tactics 
Dealing with the problem of trust therefore means establishing the causal connections 
that increase the probability that a trust judgment one way or another is correctly 
placed. There are a number of ways of doing this, of which the main four are: 
  Signalling. Would-be trustees send signals of their trustworthiness to potential 
trustors (the intended audience A). These signals may be consciously-crafted, 
such  as  wearing  a  suit  or  smiling  agreeable,  or  unconscious,  such  as 
maintaining eye contact or not sweating. They may come in more socialised or 
explicit  forms,  such  as  via  reputation,  endorsements  or  credentials.  One 
important  class of signal  is  something that is a by-product  of a successful 
operation;  for  instance,  a  trustworthy  professional  will  often  earn  a  lot  of 
money, and therefore her fashionable clothes  and expensive car are telling 
signals. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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  Reciprocity. Very often trust situations involve reciprocal agreements, perhaps 
implicit, between trustor and trustee. People offer services and expect other 
services in return, whether or not these are laid down in a formal or semi-
formal contract. Reciprocity need not take the form of a pair of coordinated 
actions;  it  may  simply  be  the  expectation  that  X  can  rely  on  Y  in  some 
circumstances, and that Y will return the favour in others (for example, each 
agrees to babysit for the other’s children in principle, without  setting up a 
series of dates when this will happen). In such an arrangement, it may be that 
only one part of the bargain is ever fulfilled (for example, because as a matter 
of fact Y’s oldest daughter has reached an age where she is able to babysit for 
her siblings, and so Y never actually needs a babysitter), but this does not 
count as a defection or reneging by X and Y will not hold it against him. 
  Institutions. Society sets up institutions that enable people to trust each other. 
Indeed,  trustor  and  trustee  may  never  even  have  any  idea  of  their  mutual 
involvement, as  with  a  bank when savers lend  to  borrowers, but  mediated 
through the bank itself. The bank takes upon itself the effort of investigation of 
borrowers, thereby lowering the cost and increasing the effectiveness of such 
investigation, through economies of scale. Other institutions, such as contract 
(in those societies where contracts are routinely respected), enable trustor and 
trustee to deal directly with far more confidence than two strangers would 
otherwise. 
  Sanctions.  If  a  potential  trustor  has  available  to  him  a  suite  of  effective 
sanctions that he can apply to a would-be trustee, then his confidence that the 
trustee  will  behave  in  a  trustworthy  manner  will,  all  things  being  equal, 
increase. He will be able to convince himself that the trustee is more likely to 
judge that trustworthiness is in her own interests, as it would be also in her 
own interests to avoid sanctions. One advantage of most contract systems is 
that in most countries it also puts a set of (legal) sanctions in the hands of the 
trustor (however, sanctions are not necessary to enable contracts to function, if 
in a culture people generally respected them). 
This  is  certainly  not  an  exhaustive  list,  but  signals,  reciprocity,  institutions  and 
sanctions are important mechanisms. None of them is foolproof. To take the most 
obvious example, if a signal can easily be counterfeited, then a would-be trustee can 
send  the  signal  without  actually  being  trustworthy.  Similarly,  institutions  do  not 
‘solve’ the issue of trust, they merely shift its focus. The trustor’s trust in the trustee 
becomes dependent upon his trust in the institution, with the potential for systemic 
collapse. If a trustee proves untrustworthy, then the trustor may cease to  trust the 
institution that brokered the deal. But his trust in the institution may be the only, or 
the chief, warrant for his trust in many other trustees – which he may in consequence 
withdraw  en  masse.  The  effectiveness  of  reciprocity  can  depend  on  whether  the 
reciprocal acts are performed simultaneously; if there is a lag in time then it is always 
possible for the second trustee to renege on her obligation. Finally, the usefulness of 
sanctions depends entirely on how painful they are for the trustee, how easy they are 
for the trustor to apply, and how easily they may be avoided. An untrustworthy trustee 
will no doubt spend effort and time working out ways of working with the system for 
her own ends – for example, sticking to the letter but not the spirit of the law. O’Hara, A General Definition of Trust 
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The direction of causality 
As to which mechanisms to establish causal links between trust and trustworthiness 
will work, much depends on the direction of causality between the two. Perhaps the 
most  common  view  is  that  trustworthiness  causes  trust.  Y  goes  around  being 
trustworthy for a period, and gradually earns X’s trust. If she defects (or more to the 
point is perceived by X to have defected), then she will lose X’s trust. The onus in that 
sort of transaction is on Y to ensure that she send the right signals, ideally backed up 
with  trustworthy  behaviour.  X  is  seen  as  making  a  judgment  on  prior  behaviour, 
including Y’s reputation. 
If this is taken as the canonical direction of causality, then there are two obvious 
problems. The first is how to bootstrap trust. If X has little or no information about Y, 
he cannot place his trust in her. In a wider sense, if a new community develops – 
perhaps online, or perhaps around a new market for a new type of good or service – 
then X has no information about any of the participants, and so it is hard to see how 
trust will develop between any pair of actors in such circumstances. 
The second problem is how someone who has (or is perceived to have) transgressed 
can regain trust. Does she start from zero, or less than zero? Reputational damage is 
extremely corrosive on this model of causality. 
However, there is another direction of causality, which is from trust to trustworthiness 
(it is an indication of how far game theory has influenced our psychological models 
that many would claim this is counterintuitive). X trusts Y, and from that experience 
Y  becomes  trustworthy.  She  learns,  via  X’s  input,  what  constitutes  trustworthy 
behaviour in the relevant contexts, and becomes socialised. This model renders X far 
less of a passive judge and more of an active participant in shaping the understanding 
with Y. It also makes Y less of a supplicant and more of a negotiator, working with X 
to determine the standards of her future behaviour. 
Of course, in reality the causal relations between trust and trustworthiness go in both 
directions,  depending  on  the  situation.  Trustworthiness-to-trust  is  perhaps  more 
characteristic  of  business/contractual/Gesellschaft  relationships,  while  trust-to-
trustworthiness is more likely to be found in more social/Gemeinschaft relationships. 
But there is no clear dividing line between the two, and there are no hard and fact 
‘rules’ about which direction is better. 
Furthermore, the waters are muddied in the general case by the existence of other 
types  of  relation.  Most  obviously,  we  often  trust,  or  otherwise,  on  the  basis  of 
qualities that are obviously unconnected with trustworthiness. We tend to trust people 
with symmetrical faces, and are less likely to trust people with facial hair or whose 
eyes are too close together. These extraneous factors complicate the story still further. 
Conclusion 
This working paper has defined trust as a belief in someone’s trustworthiness, and 
delved in some depth into the conceptual analysis of these two terms. This is only a 
beginning of the correct description of trust, and further issues need to be examined. 
Firstly, we need to examine the different kinds of failure of trust, and how we can 
respond to these. Second, we need to highlight and consider different types of trust – 
exactly how and on what grounds trust is placed in concrete social situations. A final 
question  is  the  social  role  of  trust  in  managing  complex  interactions  with  others. 
These questions will be addressed in future versions of this paper. 